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ABSTRACT 
This paper performs a forensic investigation to a set of Android 
mobile applications aiming at discovering sensitive information 
related to the owner of the mobile device. These applications were 
chosen based on the fact that: i) they are very popular on Google 
Play Store, ii) they handle sensitive personal information, iii) they 
have not been researched by previous works and iv) they are free 
to download and install. The three chosen applications belong to 
the following categories: bank, mobile network carrier and public 
transport. The evaluation of the security of the applications was 
performed using two techniques: code and disk analysis, as 
followed in the literature. Based on our findings we derive the 
conclusion that these applications despite their criticality have 
failed to incorporate security techniques to protect user’s sensitive 
data and a forensic analysis can reveal crucial and significant 
information from a forensics point of view.  
CCS CONCEPTS 
• Applied Computing → Computer Forensics → Evidence 
Collection, Storage and Analysis 
KEYWORDS 
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1 Introduction 
The increased use of mobile devices thus, applications, has 
created the need for application security. People use their mobile 
phones to perform most tasks of their everyday life from calling a 
taxi to booking a flight. According to 2017 statistics the total 
number of applications in Google and Apple Store were 2.8 and 
2.2 million respectively [1] while in the first quarter of 2018 the 
number of available applications was 3.8 and 2 million 
respectively [2]. Moreover, according to 2017 statistics, the time 
that users spent on a desktop in oppose to the time they spent on 
devices such as smartphones and tablets is significantly less in the 
age group 18-64 [3]. 
The need to develop secure applications that protect user’s 
information without omitting a service is imperative. In addition, 
the new legislation GDPR has been enforced in order to protect 
user’s privacy, which has caused a supplemental need for security. 
The latest Android OS version offers API’s and guidelines for 
developers with the intent to promote the adoption of secure 
practices, while the majority of new devices include an isolated 
hardware/software system named trusted execution environment 
(TEE) [4] to secure data at rest even in case the mobile device is 
rooted. Thus, it seems motivating to examine whether mobile 
applications securely store sensitive information or allow the 
discovery of valuable evidence in a forensic investigation.  
Driven by the above observation, this paper performs a 
forensic investigation to a set of Android mobile applications 
aiming at discovering sensitive information related to the owner 
of the mobile device. These applications were chosen based on the 
fact that: i) they are very popular on Google Play Store, ii) they 
handle sensitive personal information, iii) they have not been 
researched by previous works and iv) they are free to download 
and install. The three chosen applications belong to the following 
categories: bank, mobile network carrier and public transport. The 
evaluation of the security of the applications was performed using 
two techniques: code and disk analysis, as followed in previous 
researches [5]. Based on our findings we derive the conclusion 
that these applications despite their criticality have failed to 
incorporate security techniques to protect user’s sensitive data and 
a forensic analysis can reveal crucial and significant information 
from a forensics point of view.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we 
present the existing literature on application forensics focusing on 
Android OS. In section 3 we present the experiments and the 
methodology used to analyze the chosen applications. In section 4 
we present and elaborate on our findings, while in section 5 we 
draw the conclusions. 
2 Related Work 
Previous studies have analyzed a wide range of android 
applications such as social networking, instant messaging, 
banking, navigation and dating applications. More specifically, 
Chanajitt et al [6] focused on 7 e-banking mobile applications in 
Thailand. The forensic analysis conducted, focused on both 
memory and code inspection with the intent to determine different 
forms of leakage. This research discovered that the examined 
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applications posed a great threat on user’s sensitive data such as 
account number, account type, account balance, citizen ID, date of 
birth, transactions from one bank to another or user’s PIN code. 
Those threats could have been prevented if there was security by 
design. 
Hayes et al [7] studied the geolocation information collected 
by Uber application. This research tested several scenarios in 
which Uber or competitor services applications were used by 
clients in New York City. The experiments proved that Uber was 
using geolocation information for more time than what was stated 
in the privacy agreement. It also accessed geolocation information 
even in cases where a competing service was used. These findings 
obviously violate user’s privacy but could prove very useful in a 
criminal investigation. 
Zhang et al [8] examined the case of instant messaging 
applications on Android phones such as Facebook Messenger, 
Line, Hangouts and WhatsApp. Their approach involved memory 
inspection of the device used in order to determine what kind of 
data was saved. The outcome of this work is that unencrypted 
messages and chat details can be retrieved from a rooted device 
even in the case of end to end messaging offered by WhatsApp 
which could provide forensic investigators with valuable 
information. Only in the case of Facebook Messenger secret chat 
the messages are self-destructed from the database according to 
the timer.  
Another study on messaging applications is from Anglano [9] 
et. al., which focuses on the Telegram application for Android 
OS.  The presented methodology that could be used for the 
forensic analysis of different applications and combines both 
memory and source code analysis. For the experiments, Android 
Mobile Device Emulator as well as a real mobile device was 
employed. This research discussed methods to interpret the data 
stored in the main database and in the user configuration file, to 
determine the specific Telegram account used on the local device, 
and to reconstruct the contact list of the user, the chronology and 
contents of exchanged textual and non-textual messages, as well 
as to determine whether the user created or administered a secret 
chat, a (super)group, or a channel. It also proved that the 
correlation between this information could provide an additional 
aid to a forensic investigation  
Mata et al [10] chose to perform a forensic analysis on Feeld 
dating application. The investigation of Feeld application was 
focused on memory analysis using open source tools such as 
Autopsy. The findings contained personal data such as gender, 
sexual orientation or longitude and latitude which could victimize 
the user. 
Zhang et al [11] investigated the popular WeChat application 
for instant messaging. The data acquisition method used was 
dependent on the version of the application and the device, while 
the decryption of the examined files was related solely to the 
version of the application. In all cases this researched managed to 
extract the exchanged messages despite the encryption techniques 
employed by WeChat.  
Lone et al [12] focused on WhatsApp and Viber Android 
application used for messaging or calls. The methodology 
included memory analysis in both rooted and unrooted device 
mainly by inspecting the database. In the unrooted device, most 
information was encrypted while in the rooted device most of data 
such as phone numbers, exchanged messages, media files, 
location, SQL queries, deleted messages, calls made, duration of 
calls or profile pictures were found in plaintext view.    
Furthermore, Anglano et al [13] studied the case of ChatSecure 
in Android platforms used for instant messaging. The 
methodology followed focused on both memory forensics and 
source code analysis. Android device emulators were used for the 
experiments to achieve reproducibility. It was discovered that 
ChatSecure stored the messages in the database encrypted. This 
research managed to decrypt the messages by studying the source 
code of the application. This study also managed to extract the 
passphrase from the volatile memory and propose how to 
correlate the data found in the database. It was also found that 
deleted data could not be restored. 
3 Forensic analysis and Results 
The choice of the 3 examined Android mobile applications was 
not random. In fact, the selected applications are very popular on 
Google Play Store and they handle sensitive personal information, 
while to the best of our knowledge there are no previous works 
that have analyzed them. The three chosen applications belong to 
the following categories: bank, mobile network carrier and public 
transport. It is important to notice that the total number of 
applications that were examined were 15 and we selected to 
present 3 specific applications, which yielded useful information 
from a forensics point of view. All examined applications were 
obtained from Google play store during June 2018. 
Our methodology for the forensic analysis could be separated 
into two categories: code and disk analysis. The term code 
analysis refers here to the analysis of the source code to identify 
how the application manages and stores sensitive data. On the 
other hand, disk analysis refers to the examination of files that an 
application creates and manages with the aim to discover sensitive 
data into these files. In the following sections, we will present the 
methodology used to examine the applications and the 
forensically interesting results. Note that the examined 
applications will not be named; instead we use generic names to 
refer to them (i.e., Application A, Application B, etc.) for 
anonymity purposes. 
3.1 Code Analysis 
The code analysis was performed by obtaining first the .apk file of 
the application and then extracting its Java source code using 
Apktool [14], dex2jar [15] and jd-gui [16] tools. In particular, 
Apktool was used to decode the apk files to their original form 
(see Figure 1). 
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Figure 1: Apktool workflow 
Moreover, dex2jar tool was used to convert the .apk file to .jar 
which combined with the jd-gui utility, allowed us to have a 
graphical interface to view and analyze the .class files within the 
.jar file (see Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2: Dex2jar and jd-gui workflow 
3.1.1 e-Banking application  
The application A is an e-banking application and aims to 
facilitate user’s transaction and inform them about new banking 
products. Using Apktool we were able to review the manifest.xml 
file that includes the permission of the application. We observed 
that the application does not use biometrics for authentication, 
Figure 3: encryptCipher method implementation 
Figure 4: Use of encryptCipher method in LoginUsername.class and PINLogin.class 
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contrary to several other applications of this category which use 
fingerprint or face recognition. By analyzing the source code, we 
identified that instead of biometrics, application A supports the 
use of PIN as a faster and easier alternative to username and 
passwords. 
Next, we examined how the PIN of the user is stored into the 
device. In particular, through code inspection, we found two 
interesting classes named “LoginUsername” and “PINLogin”. 
Interestingly, the files contained a parameter named “key” and 
“initVector” which were statically set to “Bar12345Bar12345” 
and “RandomInitVector” respectively. As their name implies, the 
parameter “key” is used for the encryption key while “initVector” 
is the initialization vector of the encryption algorithm. These two 
parameters were used in the “encryptCipher” method as input in 
“SecretKeySpec” and “IvParameterSpec” classes without adding 
any level of randomness. Next, these two classes are used in the 
“encryptCipher” method to initialize the Java Cipher class, in 
order to encrypt the PIN of the user using AES in CBC mode (see 
Figure 3 and 4) and store it in the device. Evidently, since the key 
and the initialization vector are static, it leads us to the conclusion 
that the produced ciphertext is deterministic [17] and can be easily 
decrypted to obtain the user’s PIN. As a side note, the latest 
version released in September 2018, the vulnerabilities described 
have been fixed.  
3.2 Disk Analysis 
Disk analysis was performed using a real mobile device. For the 
inspection of the applications we used a rooted Samsung Galaxy 
J5. In addition, Root Browser Android application [18] was used 
in order to access rooted device files and DB Browser for SQLite 
[19] investigate the files. 
3.2.1 Mobile Network Carrier application 
Application B is created and owned by a mobile carrier company, 
which is available for free on Google Play Store. The application 
aims to facilitate company’s prepaid subscribers in their daily 
usage such as monitor their balance and expenses or receive 
exclusive offers.  
A copy to a computer was made in order to analyze the 
abovementioned files. The employed Tools were Droid Explorer 
[20] which were used to preview and copy the application files to 
a computer for analysis. In order to use application B, registration 
Figure 5: Structure of Web Data file 
Figure 6: Data found in \cache folder (the IP address has been blurred) 
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is required. To put theory into practice, we registered to the 
application by providing a name and a surname in the registration 
form. Furthermore, a mobile number, a username and an email 
address were given. Last but not the least, the application required 
a credit card in order for users to pay a bill or renew a service. We 
provided a random data for the credit card (e.g., random card 
number, random owner, etc.). 
The data of this application are saved in 
\data\data\operator’s_name folder, which contains several 
subfolders and is accessed only by root user. An important 
subfolder is the \app_webview which includes files that store 
valuable information for forensic investigation. Web Data file is 
probably the most important file that was found during 
investigation of this Android application. It is a file acting as 
database, with many tables. From all the contents inside, autofill 
table is subject of significant interest as plenty of findings were 
discovered inside. The table comprises from data that is populated 
from user inputs to the application. Name, surname, mobile 
number, username, password, and most importantly all the 
information of our entered credit card (e.g., number, owner, etc.) 
was found unencrypted. Also, there are columns storing dates 
both for their creation and the last time they were used (see Figure 
5). 
3.2.2 Public transport application 
The third application (i.e., Application C) that we examined 
provides information for public transportation informing users 
about scheduled bus routes, routes and locations of buses in real 
time, as well as bus stops. As in the previous application, we 
performed a disk analysis to discover forensic data. 
For Application C, application’s data were stored in 
\data\data\com.att.android.tfa folder, which includes the \cache, 
\code_cache, \databases, \files, \no_backup, \shaders and 
\shared_prefs folders. It is very interesting the fact that the 
\databases folder, the tfa.db database contained information about 
bus routes and timetables. Some important tables should be also 
referred. That is, SearchHistory table contained user’s search 
history for buses and in the UVersions table, the version of each 
table and the last time the application was updated were saved. 
Finally, Favorites table contained the routes that the user saved as 
favorites.  
In addition, the \cache folder included the \volley subfolder, 
which was created because the Volley library was used making 
networking easier and faster. This folder contained files that store 
data regarding user's requests to the server. For example, each 
time user was selected to know in real time the position of a bus, a 
corresponding request to the server with all the necessary 
information was created. It contained the IP address to which the 
Android application communicates and parameters related to the 
information the user was looking for. For example, Figure 6 
illustrates a user request made for the location of bus (act = 
getBusLocation) with 2005 Route ID (p1 GET parameter). 
4 Discussion 
Our analysis shows that despite their criticality, the examined 
applications either store personal information in an insecure 
manner (i.e., Application A stores the PIN using a static key) or in 
plaintext (i.e., Application B and C store several personal 
information in tables without encryption). The findings of this 
research can be summarized in the following table: 
Table 1: Summary of findings 
Application Application 
Category 
Findings 
Application 
A 
e-Banking  User’s PIN 
Application 
B 
Mobile Network 
carrier  
User’s personal 
information (username, 
password, credit card 
number, owner and 
CVV) unencrypted in a 
rooted device 
Application 
C 
Public transport  User’s personal 
information regarding 
public transportation 
(favorite routes, history 
of previous searches) in 
a rooted device 
 
These findings could prove valuable to forensic investigators 
but could also severely impact user’s privacy, if used by 
adversaries. If intruders gain access to user’s device, they could 
unencrypt user’s PIN and perform transactions without user’s 
consent, which could lead to serious financial damage 
(Application A). The same scenario applies when intruders 
acquire user’s device and consequently extract user’s credit card 
information such as number, owner and CVV (Application B). 
Even in cases where the data leakage seems less important as 
there is no financial loss, its effects on user’s privacy could prove 
harmful. For example, if adversaries manage to exploit user’s 
device, they could find their favorite routes and history searches 
and hence, use this information to physically insult the victim 
(Application C). Additionally, attackers could use this information 
to track user’s movements, discover their home or job location, 
identify their habits (for instance, if the user searches the routes of 
a specific stadium every Friday afternoon, an attacker could 
deduce that this user supports a specific football team).  
However, we argue that in the near future the situation may 
change in the sense that new devices incorporate additional 
security technologies including the Trusted Execution 
Environment (TEE) [4], which stores keys in an isolated - from 
the main OS - environment. Thus, if the application stores 
personal data using an encryption key stored in the TEE, an 
investigator has no means to read the encrypted key even with 
root privileges. The latest versions of Android (i.e., ≥ 7.0) enforce 
the use of TEE (if it is available) using the Android keystore 
system. The latter is used to generate and manage key material, 
PCI ‘18, November 29-December 1, 2018, Athens, Greece I. Kitsaki et al.  
 
 
 
which is bound to the secure hardware and can never be exposed 
to the outside environment. On top of that, disk encryption in 
Android uses a key which is located in the TEE and therefore 
cannot be extracted. Accordingly, new forensic methodologies 
and research is required for such cases. It is important though, that 
developers incorporate state-of-the-art security techniques, 
especially when dealing with user’s personal information.   
5 Conclusions 
In this research, we have combined different techniques and tools 
in order to perform a forensic analysis on applications that are 
widely used in our everyday life. We performed both source code 
analysis and disk forensics with the intent to examine all aspects 
of forensic analysis on Android applications. The results of this 
work revealed various user’s personal information that is stored 
insecurely and provide important forensic evidences. It is evident 
that a leakage of crucial information such as user’s credit card 
information and transactions, could seriously violate user’s 
privacy. Even in cases where the leaked information seems less 
crucial, such as user’s favorite bus routes, their privacy hence, 
their safety could be seriously harmed. The need to develop new 
security techniques and implement them correctly is imperative. 
Developers need to stay updated on new security techniques and 
apply them by design. 
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